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An Introduction to the

Kentucky Penal Code:
A Critique of Pure Reason?
By KATHLEEN F. BmcKEY'
Our present criminal law is a product of historical accidents,
emotional overreactions, and the comforting political habit
of adding a punishment to every legislative proposition.'
The 1972 legislative session may be recorded as one characterized by more demonstrative evidence concerning pending
legislation than any in history. From the now infamous wild
turkey unleashed in the House to stimulate debate on a proposed
industrial loan bill, 2 to the homemade brownies intended to
sweeten the legislators' dispositions toward transfer of territory
of certain school districts,3 to the diaper pails which bedecked
the marble staircase ascending to legislative chambers where
hearings on a liberalized abortion law were in progress 4-it was
anything but a dull session.
It was in this arena that the criminal law of Kentucky was
dragged, screaming, into the twentieth century. The task was
not an easy one for any of the participants-members of the
Advisory Committee, the drafting staff, legislators, or the public.
But somehow four years of careful deliberation, expenditure of
thousands of dollars, dissemination of a considerable amount of
misinformation, and emotional public reaction culminated in the
enactment of House Bill 197-the Kentucky Penal Code."
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville; A.B. 1965, University
of Kentucky; J.D. 1968, University of Kentucky.
'N. Momuss & G. HAWKINS, THEIHONEST POIMCIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Moamss & HAWKINS].

2 H.B. 236, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Beg. Sess.
3 H.B. 440, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Beg. Sess.
4 H.B. 197, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. § 276 [hereinafter cited as H.B.
197].
5 Ky. AcTS ch. 385 (1972) [chapter 385 is hereinafter cited as KYPC]; PnoPOSED Ky. REYv. STAT. §§ 438A.1-010 to 435A.3-060 [hereinafter cited as [KRSI].

PENAL CODE-A CRTIQUE OF PUE REASON?

I. GENESIS AND GOALS
The Kentucky Penal Code is the first complete revision and
codification of Kentucky's substantive criminal law. Although
the present law was "revised" in 1962, the primary thrust of
that effort was merely to organize and renumber existing provisions scattered throughout the statute books. There was no
attempt to update in toto the form and substance of the criminal
statutes. Piecemeal revision can not serve as an adequate substitute for a full scale reconciliation of the many conflicting and
overlapping penal provisions. "The proliferation of the corpus
of law, the failure to distill and refine, to reduce to minimums, can
hurl the system out of control."6 In tacit recognition of this
proposition, the 1968 General Assembly directed the Kentucky
Crime Commission and the Legislative Research Commission to
undertake a complete revision of Kentucky's substantive criminal
law.

7

Drawing heavily upon the Model Penal Code and recent
criminal law revisions of other states, a team of four drafters
worked under the guidance of a twelve member advisory committee in an attempt to bring order and rationality to the state's
substantive law of crimes. In addition to purging the existing
criminal law of many anachronistic provisions, the major objectives of the project were to codify and fully define all criminal
offenses, to eliminate the need for "special legislation" in the
sphere of criminal law, and to provide a uniform classification
of crimes.
Codification and definition of crimes and general principles of
criminal liability were an absolute necessity. Not only had the
haphazard proliferation of penal laws resulted in overlapping
and inconsistent statutory provisions, but it also failed to come
to grips with the problems posed by the fact that Kentucky
criminal law incorporates a substantial amount of common law
which has never been embodied in statutes. This left the task
of formulating and reconciling numerous aspects of criminality
entirely to the courts. The direct beneficiary of this diabolical
non-system was the lawyer upon whom the burden of ferreting
out "the law" pertaining to a particular offense was imposed.
( R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 182 (1971).

7H.R. 430, Ky. AcTs ch. 232 (1968).
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This process consisted of rummaging through poorly indexed
statutes and laboriously researching appellate court decisions to
gain access to very basic information which was otherwise inaccessible. The Penal Code abolishes common law crimes and
requires a statutory definition of every criminal offense.' By
utilizing clearly defined terminology which is systematically integrated into the document,9 the Code provides an authoritative
central source for determining the relevant points of law in any
given criminal case.
Redefinition also serves to reduce the number of statutes by
eliminating laws proscribing substantially similar conduct and
having wholly illogical distinctions. This "special legislation" is
quietly put to rest by Code provisions of broader applicability.
The Code provides a unified sentencing structure by creating
seven classes of offenses. 10 The classification scheme abolishes the
tremendous disparities in punishment for offenses of equal
gravity" and provides a remedy for inconsistent and discriminatory sentencing practices.
While the 378 page Final Draft and accompanying commentary was a progressive and commendable achievement, it
was not without attendant problems and vocal critics. Among
the specific targets of criticism were sections of the published
draft embarrassingly garbled by printing errors,'12 controversial
provisions which largely functioned as lightning rods attracting
sporadic fits of vituperation, 3 and instances in which current
notions of "law and order" clashed squarely with traditional concepts of justice.4
8 H.B. 197 § 2.
9 See, e.g., id. at §§ 9, 12 and 27.
10 Id. at § 283.
11 See examples cited at note 44 infra.

12For example, a provision permitting therapeutic abortion following a
pregnancy resulting from rape or other felonious intercourse upon certification by

three physicians provided "such certificate shall be filed with the hospital in
which the abortion is to be performed at least forty-eight hours prior to the
abortion, and in case of an abortion following felonious intercourse [sic] with the
County Attorney." KEnTucKY LEGISLATivE REsFncH Cosmissrom, KENTrucKy
PENAL CODE § 3315(3) (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRC].
13

Among primary areas of public concern were the abortion provision and the

absence of any provision punishing homosexual conduct between consenting adults.
14 The Final Draft authorized the use of deadly physical force by a defendant

when he believed the person against whom such force was used was attempting
to dispossess him of his tangible, movable property. LRC § 435(2) (d). This was
one of the issues upon which there was no unanimity among the drafters and Ad-

visory Committee members.
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Tim LEGISLATIV PROCESS: PoLrrics AND

=ra PUBLIC

On January 20, 1972, House Bill 197 was introduced
•..creating an entirely new penal code; 86 major areas of
criminal law would be affected by enacting new sections to
replace the major portions of KRS Chapters 432, 483, 434,
435, 436, 437, and 438 and small portions of other chapters;
repeal major portions of the present above listed chapters
and smaller portions of other chapters, and amend numerous
sections to conform. 5
The following morning the public was informed of this action
in an Associated Press article which heralded "House bill would
ease abortions."' 6 Some seven additional column inches were
then devoted to describing the "abortion bill." Only passing
reference was made of the "entirely new penal code" and the
7
other 35 major areas affected by the legislation.'
After being referred to the House Judiciary Committee for
consideration, House Bill 197 was subjected to public and private
scrutiny. The public aspects are easy to recount; the private
aspects remain a mystery. Public hearings on House Bill 197
narrowed the focus of deliberations to two aspects of the billdrugs' 8 and abortion.' 9 Somewhere in all of this hoopla was "an
entirely new penal code" waiting to be enacted. But this idea
was rapidly fading.
A larger issue is being obscured by the thunder and lightning
loosed on the proposed revision of Kentucky's abortion law.
It involves the unquestioned merits of the proposed penal
I') 10 Ky. LEG. Rrc. 65 (March 30, 1972) [hereinafter cited as LEG. Rc.].
36 Louisville Courier-Journal Jan. 21, 1972, § A, at 15, col. 3.
17
The same day House Bill 48, increasing the penalty for assaulting prison

guards, was reported favorably out of the House Judiciary Committee. As discussed infra, the primary purpose of this bill was to save financially pressed counties
the expense of holding such offenders while awaiting trial and during their sentence.
Ironically, the headline did not read "Bill to ease financially pressed county jails
reported favorably," but read instead "Bill to stiffen assault penalty draws support." Id. at
14, col. 1.
,A,at
Is IJIC §§2900-15. The drug bearings were reported in one-half inch headlines "Panel Hears Debate On Legalizing Marijuana Possession," hut the attendant
publicity failed to note that nowhere in the Penal Code was it proposed that
marijuana possession be legalized. See Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 8, 1972,
§ B, at 1, col. 1.
19 This was the most emotional and volatile issue publicly discussed with
witnesses advocating positions ranging from total prohibition to total repeal, and
all were center stage.
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code of which the abortion section is not the most significant
portion.
But the danger that has arisen is that the abortion debate will
become the tail that wags the dog and [will]
prevent enactment
20
of the substance of the updated code.
A similar observation was made the following day by a related
source.
Anyone following the news from the Kentucky General Assembly could well have the distinct impression that the proposed Penal Code is all about abortion.
In hearings on the code, the controversy has been drawn to
the single section that occupies a little more than a page of
the 373-page draft of the proposed set of criminal laws. 2'
A. House Committee Substitute
Despite understandable public confusion concerning this "controversial bill," the House reported favorably and passed House
Bill 197, House Committee Substitute by a vote of 70-17, on March
7, 1972. As expected, the ersatz bill contained several major
changes, including the deletion of the abortion provision and
reinstatement of existing obscenity laws. 22 What was not expected, however, were provisions imposing unrealistic limitations
on retrial of a defendant,2 3 a modification of the entrapment
defense which afforded a unique justification for the commission
of a crime, 24 the abolition of common law assault, 25 and classifying as a misdemeanor intentionally causing serious physical
20 Editorial, The Louisville Times, Feb. 21, 1972, § A, at 8, col. 1.

Finley, Blurred Issue-Penal Code Proposal Covers More Than Abortion,
Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 22, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 1.
22 H.B. 197 (House Comm. Substitute) 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. §§
267-73 [hereinafter cited as House Comm. Sub.].
23 Id. at §§ 46-48.
24 "(1) A person is not guilty of an offense arising out of proscribed conduct
when he was induced or encouragedby a public servant or by a person acting in
cooperation with a public servant seeking to obtain evidence against him for the
purpose of criminal prosecution." Id. at § 44 (emphasis added). The language
contained in the original bill "and at the time of the inducement or encouragement,
he was not otherwise disposed to engage in such conduct was omitted. H.B. 197
§ 44(1),(b) (emphasis added).
25 A person is guilty of menacing when he intentionally places another person
in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." H.B. 197 § 70. Apparent confusion over the change in terminology resulted in the deletion of any
analogous provision in the House Committee Substitute.
21

1973]

PENAL CODE-A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON?

injury with a deadly weapon.2" Nevertheless, the Penal Code had
passed a major hurdle and was introduced in the Senate the fol-

lowing day. A new element was then captured by the Associated
27
Press: "Bill Would End Death Penalty For Some Crimes."
B. Senate Committee Substitute
Absent the fanfare surrounding its consideration in the House,
House Bill 197, Senate Committee Substitute, was reported favorably out of committee a week after its introduction in the Senate.28
The Senate version reinserted most of the original provisions of
House Bill 197 while accepting such changes as deletion of the
abortion provision and the pornography chapter. The bill received

its second reading in the Senate and was sent to the Rules Committee which the next day reported it out for passage with twentythree typewritten pages of amendments. While most of the 284
changes were confined to renumbering sections of the bill, some

of the substantive amendments included conditional retention
of the common law offense of abortion, 9 creation of an "ex pre

facto" law,30 significant changes in culpable mental states, 31 de26 Compare H.B. 197 § 67 with House Comm. Sub. § 67.
27 Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 25, 1972, § A, at 11, col. 6.
28H.B. 197 (Senate Comm. Substitute), 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
[hereinafter cited as Sen. Comm. Sub.].
"9 Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this
code or another statute of this state, except that if the statutes relating
to abortion, or portions thereof, are declared unconstitutional, the common law of abortion shall prevail. KYPC § 2 [KRS § 433A.1-020].
This is anathema. While the issue has recently been mooted in part by Roe v.
Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973), this unsophisticated approach to legal
roblem solving remains part of a modem criminal code. The abortion issue must
Ee approached rationally in a carefully formulated provision conforming with current constitutional guidelines.
30 KYPC § 4 [KRS § 433A.1-0401 reads as follows:
The provisions of tis code shall not apply to any offense committed prior
to its effective date, unless the defendant elects to be tried under this code.
Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same
manner as if this code had not been enacted, if he does not so elect
(emphasis added).
For want of terminolog referrin to this unprecedented sleight of hand, this
provision has been dubbed lKentucky s first "ex pre facto" law. Section 4 made
its debut in the House Committee Substitute. It was not included in the Senate
Committee Substitute, but it inexplicably reappeared in the amendments thereto.
The paramount problem presented by this section is determining just what it
means. Is the intent to permit the defendant to elect to be tried under the Penal
Code now? If so, this creates an anomalous doctrine of prospective retroactivity
since section 307 unequivocally states "This act shall become effective July 1,
1974." But perhaps section 4 is intended to apply only to defendants who commit
an offense before the effective date of the code and who are tried after that date.
(Continued on next page)
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laying required notice of the insanity defense to the day of trial,32
33
reduction of the authorized penalty for certain inchoate offenses,
creation of a strict liability theft offense 4 and elimination of
another theft crime,35 expansion of the justified use of deadly
force,36 reinstatement of criminal penalties for deviate sexual

conduct between consenting adults,37 and postponement of the
effective date of the legislation to July 1, 1974. s The Senate
passed the bill by a vote of 22-12. During the closing hours of the
session the House concurred, 47-10, and House Bill 197 was signed

into law March 27, 1972. 89
In addition to enacting the Penal Code, the House and Senate
each adopted, by voice vote, resolutions requesting the Governor
to appoint a Kentucky Penal Code Study Commission.4" In light
of the deferred effective date of the Code and the monumental
mechanical problems arising by virtue of the Code's turbulent
adoption, a thorough reevaluation of the document was essential.
Accordingly, an eight member Commission was appointed by
Executive Order. 41 The Commission's task of developing recom(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Such selective retroactivity invokes prospects of docket manipulation and constitutional problems of penalizing those who receive speedy trials by denying them
the opportunity to choose which law will govern the outcome of the case. Assuming argtuendo the constitutionality of the provision, how does a defendant exercise
this option? At what stage of the proceedings is he required to do so? Can an
indictment or information be amended to conform with the defendant's election
even though it will charge him with an additional or different offense? Obviously
the Code provides no answer. This is nothing more than a defense lawyer's pipedream.
33 Compare Sen. Comm. Sub. § 12 with KYPC § 13 [KRS § 433B.1-020].
32
Compare Sen. Comm. Sub. § 43 with KYPC § 43 [KRS § 433C.2-050].
53
Compare Sen. Comm. Sub. §§ 50, 52, with KYPC §§ 50, 52 (1972)
[KRS3 §§ 433D.1-010, 433D.1-0301. See text at note 51 infra.
4 Sen. Comm. Sub. § 122; KYPC § 122 [KRS § 434C.1-050]; see text at note
55 infra.
35 The offense eliminated was "Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition
of Property Received." Sen. Comm. Sub. § 123.
86 Compare Sen. Comm. Sub. §§ 32, 33 with KYPC §§ 32, 33 [KRS §§ 433C.1060, 433C.1-070].
37 KYPC § 91A [KRS § 434A.4-100]. The continued criminalization of
deviate sexual conduct between consenting adults reflects the view that

". . .

sup-

port for the removal of a sanction is often interpreted as support for the behavior
previously punished.
Momuss & HAwKINs, supra note 1, at 2. Removal of
the criminal sanction for private conduct which does not cause direct injury to
person or property is not equivalent to positive approval of that conduct. It is a
realization that the criminal law is an inappropriate and ineffective means of
regulating private moral conduct.
38 KYPC § 307.
439 Lxc. REc., supra note 15.
0 S.R. 96, Ky. J. OF SENATE 2981 (1972); H.R. 160, Ky. J. OF HOUSE OF REP.
3790 41(1972).
Exec. Order No. 72-614 (June 28, 1972).
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mendations for the 1974 General Assembly is difficult. It requires
reconciling numerous inconsistencies and redirecting legislative
efforts to achieve the original goal of providing Kentucky with a
modern criminal code.

III. Tim NATURE OF A CODE: EFFECT

OF COLLATERAL LEGISLATION

By definition a code is a comprehensive and systematic enactment of a body of jurisprudence. As such, the Kentucky Penal
Code includes a number of provisions of broad applicability
which set forth general principles underlying the entire document,
as well as provisions defining specific substantive offenses and
their accompanying penalities. While the structure of such an
integrated document simplifies and clarifies the law, it requires
an entirely different methodology with regard to modification of
its content.
The Penal Code consists of more than 280 interrelated provisions which have been carefully meshed to achieve internal
consistency within a unified statutory framework. Thus, amending
a Code provision is wholly different from amending other types
of statutes which are isolated provisions. Such statutes largely
function independently and amendment, therefore, has little effect
on other laws. This is simply not the case when a code is amended,
and it is imperative that this be understood before further legislative changes are considered.4 2 Otherwise the most serious
threat to the viability of the Code qua code is, ironically, the
legislative process itself. The 1972 General Assembly, succumbing
to the temptation of hasty and "isolated" changes, demonstrated
some of the pitfalls of following old legislative habits.
A. Amendments Affecting ClassificationSystem
One of the primary goals of any major criminal law revision
is that of eliminating inequities in penalty provisions. 4" Piecemeal revision inevitably leads to irrational disparities in authorized
42 Similar pleas were made following the adoption of the Uniform Connercial

Code. See, e.g., Whiteside & Lewis, Kentucky's Commercial Code-Some Initial
Problems in Security, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961); Whiteside, Amending the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 Ky. L.J. 3 (1962).
43 "From the standpoint of fundamental importance and need for revision, the
single most important area was considered to be that relating to classification of
offenses and sentencing." Nmv YORK STATE COMM'N ON REVsION OF THE PENAL
LAw AND CRMINAL CODE, NoposED NEw YoRx PENAL LAw VI (1963).
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punishment, as there is no objective reference point to which
newly enacted criminal statutes may be related. Examples of the
inverse relationship between the relative gravity of offenses and
their accompanying penalties are abundant and all too familiar. 44
One logical and presently favored approach to abolishing
these discriminatory and anomalous distinctions is the use of a
comprehensive classification system designed to provide a uniform
sentencing structure.4 ' By classifying crimes according to their
relative severity, existing and potential inconsistencies can be
avoided. The Kentucky Penal Code incorporates a classification
scheme consisting of seven classes of offenses. 46 While this con44 The litany begins as follows: Petty larceny (stealing money orproperty
worth less than $100) is punishable by a maximum of 12 months in jai, while
theft of a chicken worth $2.00 can result in a five year prison sentence. Compare
Ky. REV. STAT. § 433.230 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS], with KRS § 433.250.
Carrying a concealed deadly weapon is punishable by two to five years imprisonment, while reckless shooting into the back of an automobile carries a maximum
of 12 months imprisonment. Compare KRS § 435.230 with § 435.190. Drawing
or flourishing a deadly weapon in any school assembly, place of public worship
or on a public highway carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 50 days, while
drawing or flourishing a deadly weapon inside or on the platform of an occupied
passenger coach is punishable by a maximum of 12 months imprisonment. Compare KRS § 435.200 with § 435.210. Rape of a child under 12 may be penalized
by sentence of life imprisonment with privilege of parole, while rape of a child
over 12 is punishable by life imprisonment without privilege of parole. Compare
KRS § 435.080 with § 435.090. Et cetera ad nauseam.
45 The American Bar Association project on criminal justice adopted a standard
approving this approach:
All crimes should be classified for the purpose of sentencing into categories
which reflect substantial differences in gravity. The categories should be
very few in number. Each should specify the sentencing alternatives
available for offenses which fall within it. The penal codes of each jurisdiction should be revised where necessary to accomplish this result.
ABA PRojEcT

ON MiNIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRnMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS REL.AT-

ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATrvES AND IhocEnuEs, GENEMAL PmnPc.Es: STATUTORY Sm uCruiu, Standard 2.1(a) (Tent. Draft 1967).

The Model Penal Code which provided the impetus for criminal law revisions
throughout the country, included such a classification scheme. The lead has been
followed in several jurisdictions.
46 KYPC § 265(2) [KRS § 435A.1-060] reads as follows:
The authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for felonies are:
(a) For a Class A felony, not less than twenty years nor more than life
imprisonment;
(b) For a Class B felony, not less than ten years nor more than twenty
years;

(c) For a Class C felony, not less than five years nor more than ten years;
and
(d) For a Class D felony, not less than one year nor more than five years.
KYPC § 268 [KRS § 435A.1-090] reads in part:
a For a Class A misdemeanor, the term shall not exceed twelve months;
(b) For a Class B misdemeanor, the term shall not exceed ninety days.
KYPC § 280 [KRS § 435A.3-040] reads in part:
(1) .. . A person who has been convicted... may be sentenced to pay a fine in
an amount not to exceed:
(c) For a violation, $250.
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stitutes a vast improvement over former law, isolated amendments
to the Code as adopted threaten to undermine the conceptual
basis of the unified sentencing structure.
For example, the Final Draft submitted to the 1972 General
Assembly contained four degrees of homicide, each defined and
graded according to specified culpable mental states.
Each
homicide offense constituted a different class of felony for purposes of penal sanctions. Manslaughter in the second degree,
causing the death of another by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which the actor was aware, was
classified as a Class C felony. 48 Criminally negligent homicide,
causing the death of another person by the actor's failure to
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, was graded as a
Class D felony.40 By definition, these offenses involve types of
conduct which necessarily differ in terms of traditional notions of
blameworthiness. While the Legislature retained the two separate
and distinct offenses in the Code, the penalty for second degree
manslaughter was reduced to that of criminally negligent homicide-a Class D felony. Treatment of these two crimes as identical

in terms of the risk/harm factor is difficult to understand and
impossible to rationalize since the penalties for assault remain
undisturbed. The improbable result is that wantonly causing the
death of another is punishable by one to five years imprisonment,
while wantonly causing physical injury by means of a deadly
weapon is punishable by five to ten years imprisonment.50 The
result is clearly wrong, but failure to respect the interrelationship
of Code sections will inevitably lead to unreconciled and indefensible conflicts in penal provisions.
Another blow to the classification system was dealt by amendment of certain provisions relating to inchoate offenses. Adopting
the view that these types of crimes are generally less serious than
the completed offense to which they are merely preparatory, the
Final Draft treated attempt, solicitation and conspiracy each as
47 The four classes of criminal homicide were murder, a Class A felony; manslaughter in the first degree, a Class B felony; manslaughter in the second degree, a
Class C felony; and criminally negligent homicide, a Class D felony. H.B. 197

§§ 62-65.

020].

481d. at § 64.
40 Id. at § 65.
50 Compare KYPC § 64 [KRS § 4S4A.1-040] with KYPC § 67 [KRS § 434A.2-
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a lower degree of the crime which was the object of the actor's
conduct."' For instance, a criminal attempt would be a Class B
felony when the crime attempted was a Class A felony, a Class C
felony if the attempted crime was a Class B felony, a Class D
felony when the substantive offense was a Class C felony, and a
Class A misdemeanor when the crime attempted was a Class D
felony.
While the Legislature generally adhered to this classification
scheme, it lowered the penalty for certain attempt and solicitation
offenses. Thus, when the crime attempted or solicited is a Class
C or D felony, the inchoate offense constitutes a Class A misdemeanor.52 There may have been good reasons to modify these
provisions, but these reasons should equally apply to the conspiracy statute, which remained unchanged. Failure to reconcile
the sections across the board has created dubious results. Agreeing
(conspiracy) to commit a Class C felony is punishable as a felony.
Encouraging or commanding another to do so (solicitation) or
actually taking a substantial step toward the commission of that
crime (attempt) is a misdemeanor. This approach distorts the
meaning of classification of crimes.53
B. The Mechanics of Amendment
Amendments affecting a single provision can also be problematic if the structure of the entire section is not considered.
Theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake provides
51H.B. 197 §50, 52 and 53.
52 KYPC § 50, 52 [KRS § 433D.1-010, 433D.1-030].
53 ve bNis submitted by the Kentucky Crime Commission, the agency primarily responsible for funding and supervising the Penal Code project, were not
mmue from myopic drafting techniques. House Bill 203, which establishes a
police salary supplement program, contains a provision punishing one who
"knowingly or willfully makes any false or fraudulent statement or representation
in any record or report to the Kentucky Crime Commission. .
HB 203, 1972
Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. § 23. It is presently a felony to obtain money by false
pretenses or to make a false claim against the state. KRS §§ 434.050, 434.230,
434.240. Thus, this provision complements existing criminal statutes punishing the
submission of false or fraudulent reports or records with the intent to obtain fUds
to which the agency or individual was not entitled. What it covers, which is not
presently a criminal offense, is conduct comparable to that proscribed by Section 201
of House Bill 197-unsworn falsification to authorities, a Class B misdemeanor.
KYPC § 201 [KRS § 434E.5-100]. While the penalty in House Bill 203 is comparable to that contained in the Code, it deviates from that penalty by defining
authorized fines and sentences in terms of maximums and minimums and by including a fine which is double the amount authorized under the Penal Code for an
offense with an identical maximum term of imprisonment. If there is any jurisprudential validity in the classification system incorporated in the Penal Code, it
certainly should be applicable to this special but unincorporated offense.
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a striking example. The Final Draft defined the offense as being
committed by one who comes into control of such property and
fails to take reasonable measures to restore it to the owner with
intent to deprive him of it. 4 The Legislature amended the provision by eliminating the requirement that the actor must attempt
to restore the property to the person entitled to it. The form of
amendment was simply to delete in its entirety the subsection
containing that element. It was, however, that subsection which
also specified the requisite intent for commission of the offense.
Consequently the enacted provision defines the offense as being
committed when the actor merely "comes into control of property
of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid or delivered
under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or
the identity of the recipient." 5 Undoubtedly it was not the
purpose of the amendments drafter to create a strict liability
theft offense, but the provision contains no requirement of intent.
This puts the courts in the position of having to ignore the plain
meaning of the statute and to supply legislative text in order to
avoid direct conflict with Section 16 of the Act which specifically
prohibits imposition of absolute liability for an offense defined
in the Code unless it is only a violation. Theft of lost property is
either a Class A misdemeanor or a Class D felony, depending
upon the value of the property which is the subject of the theft.
C. The Problem of Special Legislation
A problem which frequently impairs the effectiveness of a
code is the tendency of legislatures to respond to public reaction
when new forms of old problems surface. Viewed in isolation
from their proper context, these problems give rise to the emergence of "special legislation" creating "new crimes." This, in
part, accounts for the hodgepodge of overlapping and inconsistent
criminal statutes which gave impetus to the Penal Code project.
Sections 285-306, an integral part of House Bill 197, are designed
to reconcile Code provisions with other existing statutes and to
eliminate duplication and conflict. These sections expressly repeal some 430 statutes and amend 22 others. Unfortunately,
during the 1972 legislative session a number of criminal statutes
5

4H.B. 197

§ 121.
5 KYFC § 122 [KRS § 434C.1-050].
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intended to function independently of the Code were enacted,
creating the same problems the Code was supposed to eliminate.
An example is House Bill 395 which makes punishable the
intimidation or injuring of any witness, juror or officer of the
court on account of his participation in a judicial proceeding, or
corruptly or forcibly obstructing the due administration of justice.
The bill includes a penalty of one to five years imprisonment
and/or a fine of $1,000-$5,000."6 While such conduct should be
treated as criminal, the crimes defined by this statute are not novel.
It is presently an offense to obstruct justice, to procure the absence
of a witness, to bribe a juror, to send threatening communications,
to commit an assault, and to inflict bodily injury upon another.
Such conduct may also be punishable as embracery and contempt.
The various types of conduct proscribed by House Bill 895 will
also be covered by numerous Penal Code provisions of broader
applicability such as obstructing governmental operations, r harrassing communications," terroristic threatening," menacing, 60
and assault.61
The main thrust of House Bill 395 appears to be to increase
the penalty imposed for such conduct when its object is a specified limited class of persons. While it is laudable to protect trial
participants from criminal assaults, all citizens are entitled to be
free from such intrusions. If the penalty for those existing offenses
which House Bill 895 restates is too light, the logical action is to
increase the penalty rather than to indulge in the fiction of creating a "new crime." Moreover, if the statute is designed to
remedy inadequate penalties, it both succeeds and fails. While
the penalties for offenses such as obstructing justice, sending
threatening communications, and common law assault are increased, penalties for other bodily injury offenses are decreased.6"
The same conflict exists with reference to the aforementioned
Penal Code provisions.
This problem is not unique to Kentucky legislation. In fact,
56H.B. 395, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
57KYPC § 164 EKRS § 434E.1-0201.
5 Id. at § 220 [KRS § 434F.1-080].
59 Id.at § 73 [KRS § 434A.2-080].
6o Id.at § 70 [KRS § 434A.2-050].
611d.
at §§ 66-68 EKRS §§ 434A.2-010 to .2-030].
62
See, e.g., KRS § 435.170 authorizing imprisonment for two to twenty-one
years for malicious and wilful shooting, cutting, or poisoning.
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it closely parallels recent experiences in other states which have
labored long and hard to codify and modernize criminal law. One
striking example is the Illinois "Masked Gunman Bill" which was
drafted in response to a situation where the suspects were apprehended "while riding in a stolen automobile while masked
and carrying unconcealed weapons." Although the police believed
the men were planning either murder or robbery, they lacked
sufficient evidence to support such a charge and were compelled
to content themselves with merely charging the suspects with
auto theft. Shortly thereafter a bill was introduced in the Illinois
General Assembly making it a felony for any person to possess a
firearm on his person or in his vehicle "when he is hooded, robed
or masked in such a manner as to conceal his identity." The crime,
which includes no element of intent, is punishable by one to five
years imprisonment in the penitentiary-a penalty which vastly
exceeds that authorized for possession of a deadly weapon with
intent to use it unlawfully against another person. The bill passed
both houses of the Legislature unanimously.63
Perhaps it was this form of legislative treatment of criminal
law which provoked Clarence Darrow to lash out at those who
"constantly cudgel their brains to think of new things to punish,
and severer penalties to inflict on others."6 4 While legislatures are
continuously subjected to pressures from various interest groups
and the general public, the responsive action must be tempered
with reason and concern for its consequences. Clearly this is
not always the case, and the preceding Kentucky and Illinois
statutes are examples of the exercise of bad legislative judgment.
There are, however, variations on this theme which require more
difficult decisions. They include proposals which have a practical
basis for consideration but which call for an awkward or inappropriate legislative response. Another new Kentucky criminal
statute illustrates this particular problem.
House Bill 48, introduced January 7, declared that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any prisoner confined at the penitentiary or at any other institution or facility operated by the
Department of Corrections to assault or batter any guard,
63

Heinz, Gettleman & Seeskin, Legislative Politics and the Criminal Law, 64

Nw. U.L. Rzv. 272, 292-93 (1969).
64 C. DAnmow, TnE STony OF My LaFE 122 (1932).

KENTucKY LAw JouNALV

[Vol. 61

officer, warden, employee ... or any person who, not being
a prisoner, is lawfully in or about the penitentiary or other
institution or facility. 65
This portion of the bill merely restates the commonly understood
prohibition against assault and battery, but with respect to a
narrowly defined class of persons. The penalty imposed by the
original bill was one to five years imprisonment, a significant increase in existing penalties for ordinary assault and battery.6
The really novel aspect of the bill is that a prisoner accused of
this crime shall be confined in the penitentiary rather than a
county jail while awaiting trial.
The bill passed the House by a vote of 68-17,7 but became
bogged down in the Senate Judiciary Committee because of
concern over imposition of harsher penalties upon imprisoned
felons who commit an offense punishable by a maximum of twelve
months in jail when committed by non-prisoners."' Two members
of the House appeared before the committee to explain the need
for such legislation.60 It was stated that Oldham and Lyon counties, the locations of Kentucky's two state penitentiaries, are
financially burdened by the problem created when a prisoner
assaults a guard. The prisoner is confined in the county jail to
await trial, and, if he is convicted, he is subject to a fine and/or
a sentence up to one year in that jail. He may not be returned
to the penitentiary to serve the sentence since assault is a misdemeanor and penitentiary sentences are authorized only for
felony convictions.7 0 At the time the bill was under consideration
the Oldham County jail had seven such prisoners serving sentences for assaulting a penitentiary guard. 71 After consideration
of the legislation in light of these problems, the bill was reported
65 H.B. 48, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., § 1.
66 KRS § 431.075.
67 LEG. REc., supra note 15, at 50.
08 Two House Members Push Prisoner-PenaltyBill, Louisville Courier-Journal
Feb. 11, 1972, § A, at 11, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Two House Members].
60 Id. The House members appearing before the committee were Rep. Jay

Louden,
D-Carrolton and sponsor of the b'l, and Rep. Richard Lewis, D-Benton.
0
7 KRS § 431.060.
71 Two House Members, supranote 68.

favorably with an amendment redefining the penalty as a maximum of twelve months imprisonment (the penalty for ordinary
assault and battery) to be served in the penitentiary. House Bill

1973]

PENAL

CODE-A CRITIQUE OF PURE BEASON?

48 was passed as amended, signed by the Governor, and became
effective June 16, 1972.72
The result of this effort was the creation of another "new
crime" which is identical in definition and penalty with an existing
crime. In order to avoid such needless duplication which merely
clutters and confuses the criminal statutes a carefully drafted
amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes § 431.216 (1972), dealing with commitment of prisoners to the custody of the Department of Corrections, would have been a preferable alternative.
Maverick legislation such as House Bill 395 and House Bill 48
must be repealed before the Penal Code becomes effective if it
is to bear any resemblance to a true code.
IV. TBE KENTucKY PENAL CODE: A SuccEss STORY?
From the standpoint of positive impact on a massive body of
substantive law, the Penal Code makes tremendous headway
toward accomplishing needed reforms. Classification of offenses
lends uniformity to the statutory structure of the law of crimes
and eliminates arbitrary sentencing practices without being inflexible. This is a milestone for Kentucky criminal law. Codification signifies the elimination of archaic criminal provisions and
special legislation which are indigenous to our criminal law. It
also means consolidation of offenses by use of well defined provisions of broader applicability than prior statutes, thus greatly
simplifying and clarifying the law. Incorporation of general principles of criminal liability and provisions relating to inchoate
offenses serves to provide concrete definitions where none heretofore existed. The format utilizes a topical arrangement of provisions which should facilitate research as well as amendment.
The overall product is a welcome and needed change in a long
ignored critical area.
This is not to say, however, that the Code as adopted
eliminates all of the defects that it was intended to remedy. The
long-range implications must be given serious attention before
the 1974 General Assembly convenes.
The purposes of the Penal Code will be subverted if the
Legislature persists in continuing the current trend toward pro72

LEG. REC., supra note 15, at 50.
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liferation of statutory law. This will cause undue complexity and
substantially impair the functional approach contained in the
Code. New criminal legislation must be carefully considered lest
it conflict with rather than complement Code provisions. New
legislative techniques and analytical skills must be developed
with a view toward perceiving the structural relationships implicit in any true code.
This is not to suggest, however, that the process of codification
is equivalent to that of ossification. The emergence of issues not
adequately dealt with is an absolute certainty, and this will
require amendment and/or repeal of some provisions of the Code.
But sensible revision cannot be accomplished on an ad hoc basis.
Complete reform is a long term project which requires continuing
attention. Careful analysis of the interrelationship of an isolated
bill with all other criminal laws cannot be sandwiched in by
legislators who are given 60 days every two years to consider
1,048 bills and 261 resolutions, as in 1972.
It is strongly urged that a permanent body of impartial and
qualified persons be established to review proposed criminal
legislation and to advise the Legislature as to the effects of such
proposals on the Penal Code. Some will undoubtedly be superfluous, others critically needed. But it is of paramount importance
that dedicated efforts by those having the requisite expertise
play an integral part in this ongoing process. The structural and
substantive integrity of this complex body of law must not only
be safeguarded by constant surveillance, but it must also be
adapted to respond to the inevitable social and legal. changes
which will confront the administration of criminal justice.

